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This paper is guided by an empirical exploration of how 
Venezuelan late president Hugo Chávez’s presence in the 
media –essentially through the talk-show Aló Presidente 
and his official broadcast messages known as cadenas 
(‘chains’)– were interpreted by Venezuela’s journalists, 
media professionals and expert commentators; the impact 
they had on their journalistic practice; and the ways in 
which Chávez’s speeches defined the national informa-
tion agenda, according to opinions of journalists, media 
practitioners and commentators.
Few countries have witnessed in the twenty-first cen-
tury a surge of its local media as a political battleground 
as intensely as Venezuela did under Chávez’s government 
or under his hand-picked successor, Nicolás Maduro –with 
the broadcast program Aló Presidente as its centerpiece 
(McCoy and Myers 2004; Cañizalez 2016; Lozada 2016). 
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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Chávez’s Aló Presidente and its Impact on Venezuela’s 
Journalistic Practice
Ed Bracho-Polanco
As Venezuela’s leader, Hugo Chávez utilized the media intensively and innovatively to boost his radical 
political project. The broadcast talk-show Aló Presidente became the most important component of his 
communication strategy, followed by his use of blanket broadcast messages. Chávez’s flagship program 
subverted liberal tenets, and has to this day served as a template in Latin America for populist commu-
nication. This study examined the ways Venezuelan journalists and media professionals have understood 
Chávez’s hyper-mediatic leadership –with special emphasis on Aló Presidente– and the impact the program 
and the official blanket messages had on their practice. A wide array of journalists, media practitioners, 
and commentators were interviewed about their views regarding Chávez’s media strategies and Aló Presi-
dente, and tensions arising between different ideals of normative journalistic practice. Opinions among 
local journalists about the above-mentioned issues, this study found, are divided within a highly-polarized 
frame. And normative media ideals of liberal trends were challenged by pro-Chávez journalists, while an 
important faction of media professionals maintained that such practices are non-democratic.
Keywords: journalism studies; journalism and media practice; media regulations; populism; Venezuela; 
Hugo Chavez; Hello President
En calidad de líder de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez utilizó los medios comunicacionales de manera intensa e 
innovadora, para así promover su radical proyecto político. El programa televisivo Aló Presidente llegó a 
convertirse en el componente más importante de su estrategia comunicacional, seguido del uso de sus 
‘cadenas’ audiovisuales. Este programa insignia de Chávez subvertía ideales liberales, y hasta el día de hoy 
funciona como un modelo de comunicación populista en América Latina. El presente estudio examina las 
formas en las que periodistas y profesionales de medios venezolanos entienden el liderazgo híper-mediático 
de Chávez –con especial énfasis en Aló Presidente– y el impacto que dicho programa y los mensajes ‘en 
cadena’ han ejercido en su oficio. Una amplia gama de periodistas, profesionales y comentaristas de medios 
fueron entrevistados sobre sus opiniones en relación a las estrategias mediáticas de Chávez, Aló Presi-
dente, y las tensiones que surgen entre variados ideales sobre la práctica de periodismo normativo. El 
estudio revela que las opiniones de los periodistas locales sobre los asuntos arriba mencionados se dividen 
dentro de un marco de alta polarización. Igualmente, los ideales mediáticos normativos de tendencias 
 liberales son desafiados por periodistas pro–Chávez, al tiempo que una facción importante de profesionales 
de medios sostiene que tales prácticas son anti-democráticas.
Palabras clave: estudios de periodismo; periodismo y práctica de los medios; normativa mediática; 
populismo; Venezuela; Hugo Chávez; Aló Presidente
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There exists literature characterizing Chávez’s political 
project or his populist model. There are also some studies 
that analyze the profile and content of Aló Presidente –its 
discourse, rhetorical style, dominant themes, audiences 
(García 2006; Reyes-Rodríguez 2008; Frajman 2014). Yet, 
there are no reliable studies that address the opinions and 
perceptions of journalists and media practitioners about 
how they characterize Chávez’s media products, specifi-
cally Aló Presidente and the official blanket broadcasts; 
or how they ‘negotiated’ the content of these audiovisual 
programs and understood their communicative purpose, 
journalistic values, and news agenda-setting.
Assessing Aló Presidente, Chávez’s communication style 
and, more specifically, the impact these have had on jour-
nalism and media practice in Venezuela contributes to 
understanding the tensions between populist and liberal 
tenets in the context of mediated communications and 
journalism in Venezuela, and beyond. Under the global 
rise of populism, it seems pressing to review and analyze 
how a radical and pioneering media strategy –as con-
structed by one of the twenty-first century’s most person-
alistic and charismatic leaders– affected journalistic ideals 
and media practices within a national context.
The original contribution of this study is the empirical 
examination of media professionals’ views and attitudes 
in Venezuela vis-à-vis the media strategies of Chávez while 
he was in power –with emphasis on his centerpiece Aló 
Presidente and its impact on news and media production 
in the nation. This research’s findings and discussions are 
relevant to the field of sociology of journalism, political 
communications, and democracy studies in both liberal 
and non-liberal contexts. It is a study that, by empirically 
evaluating the clash of different ideals in media practice, 
can help identify study areas in which to further explore 
the complex relationship between journalism and the ris-
ing trend of anti-liberal populism.
In view of some arguments formulated by media practi-
tioners and commentators on political and media changes 
in Venezuela under Chávez, the research’s leading hypoth-
esis is that the populist traits of Chávez’s media strategy 
and programs, the radical politicization of both pro-gov-
ernment and oppositional news media, and the highly-
polarized political climate in Venezuela, have deeply 
affected the practice of certain core concepts and notions 
of professional journalism, particularly in accordance with 
normative liberal models.
During the Chávez era –from his rise to power as elected 
President in February 1999 to his death while still hold-
ing office in March 2013– political bias in Venezuelan 
news media gained terrain significantly, mirroring like 
few other phenomena the way the country became highly 
polarized (Parra 2010; Kitzberger 2012; Waisbord 2012). 
This political environment profoundly transformed that 
of the media, and journalists became agents of specific 
ideological advocacy and rivalling political militancy 
(Bisbal 2008 and 2009; Lozada 2016). Such scenario in the 
media is argued to conflict with basic notions of balanced, 
accurate, transparent journalistic and media output –as 
upheld by liberal principles of media practice (Schudson 
1995 and 2003; Keane 1991). As a consequence, the 
opposed views –those that are pro-Chávez and those of 
the opposition– by which the media represent reality have 
affected the nature of plural and constructive discussion 
within Venezuela’s society (Bisbal 2009; Cañizalez 2009 
and 2016; Caballero 2010).
The program Aló Presidente was first transmitted in May 
1999 and it continued its live transmissions in the majority 
of government-owned television and radio stations almost 
every Sunday while Chávez was alive and in good health. 
Its format was that of a talk-show in which the President 
conversed for an average of four hours (sometimes for 
over eight hours) about his ideas and political plans, his 
Presidential agenda, and selectively answered questions 
from the public, while often resorting to personal anecdotes 
 (MPPCI 2007; Cañizalez 2009 and 2016; Frajman 2014).
Another important communication tool employed by 
Chávez –and still used by his successor Maduro– were the 
official blanket broadcasted messages or cadenas. With 
the exception of cable or satellite television stations, all 
broadcasting outlets in the country are under legal obli-
gation –even before Chávez’s arrival to power– to trans-
mit the cadenas. It is estimated that between September 
1999 and July 2009, Chávez broadcast 1,992 national 
blanket messages; which added to over 1,250 hours or 
52 days per year (Ipys 2010; Cañizalez 2016). Such an 
estimate is exceptional in Venezuela’s history –previous 
Presidents accumulated a maximum of a two-hundred 
hours yearly (Ibid).
Chávez’s followers viewed these Presidential messages 
and his communicational style in a positive light, and as 
a necessary component of a radical political project of 
emancipation (McCoy and Myers 2004; Ellner 2007; Parra 
2010; Artz 2017). However, the nation’s political opposi-
tion, and many organizations that monitor freedom of 
expression and human rights, accused Chávez’s govern-
ment of attempting to impose a mediatic hegemony, 
silence his critics, and weaken democratic practice –alle-
gations the late President and his followers denied (Ellner 
2007; Amnesty International 2010; Provea 2010 and 2014; 
Cañizalez 2011).
Some observers have characterized Chávez as authoritar-
ian, militarist, and caudillista; while others contend that he 
is anti-liberal, revolutionary, anti-oligarchic, and messianic 
(Lander 2008; Zúquete 2008; Caballero 2010). However, 
there is consensus among rivalling views that the President 
employed Aló Presidente and the media as a strategic means 
to enhance popular participation and mobilization. Aló 
Presidente and cadenas are prime examples of the use of 
media in a populist manner; and were emulated to vary-
ing degrees by other political leaders –most notably Rafael 
Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in 
Nicaragua, and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina 
(Zúquete 2008; Bisbal 2009; Frajman 2014). This media 
strategy redefined a tension –not too visible in Venezuela 
before Chávez’s rule– between different tenets of journal-
istic practices as held by liberal and populist perspectives.
Normative journalistic practice: Colliding views 
in Chávez’s Venezuela
When discussing normative journalism it must be stressed 
that its dominant model stems from the Western liberal 
tradition. Yet, the latter’s set of ideals about journal-
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istic and media practice have been refuted by various 
counter-hegemonic formulations, most notably by those 
underpinned by Marxist and political economy positions 
(Curran 2002; Nerone 2012). In order to broaden theo-
retical discussion and to problematize the case studied, 
two contrasting frameworks of normative journalism are 
reviewed –the liberal and its Marxist-inspired critique.
Within a liberal framework, normative and professional 
ideals in the media include providing the public with a 
systematic means to check on state authorities, institu-
tions, and power groups (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; 
Curran 2002; Waisbord 2013). Importantly, these tenets 
stress that journalism should be a source of balanced, 
diverse and transparent information; while providing plu-
ral access for all citizens to the media and serving as a plat-
form for rational deliberation and discussion of political 
views (Ibid).
These normative ideals –emanating from liberal tradi-
tions– have been drawn mainly within the context of the 
Anglo-American orbit (McQuail 2005; Waisbord 2013). 
Yet, within this current there seems to exist disparity and 
tension between the seemingly democratic principles that 
the media ‘are supposed to serve and the communications 
structures and practices that actually prevail’ (Gurevitch 
and Blumler 1990: 270). These normative ideals in media 
and journalism should be driven by a ‘public-oriented 
logic that is not subsumed under particular interests of 
the markets, politics, and bureaucracies’ (Waisbord 2013: 
126). Under this view, only ‘journalism informed by higher 
values that transcend social differences and personal inter-
ests, and probes the logic of markets and politics, deserves 
to be called professional’ (Ibid: 127).
Accordingly, Mancini (cited by McQuail 2005) argues 
that, under this liberal media framework, there exists 
a twofold ‘gap’ between the normative/professional 
theories and the practice in various countries. One, he 
observes, refers to the manner in which the investigative 
role of journalism hardly receives any normative recog-
nition. The other alludes to the journalistic principles of 
supposed balance, neutrality and independence, when in 
practice most journalists tend to work ‘in close symbiosis’ 
with powerful economic and political groups, government 
officials, and authorities (Ibid: 175). This formulation 
derives, not from Hallin’s and Mancini’s elaboration of 
their much-cited three models of media and politics –
which has been criticized due to its alleged reductionist 
characterizations of media systems (Humphreys 2011)– 
but from a shared view of other authors that affirm there 
is common ground regarding norms of professional jour-
nalism in many nations with distinct journalistic cultures 
(Siebert et al 1956; Schudson 1978; Schiller 1979 cited in 
Nerone 2012).
As a way to legitimize the professionalism of journal-
ism and its civic purpose, some authors of the liberal 
tradition claim that news media can effectively serve not 
only as a key instrument for disseminating information 
but as a platform through which the public can engage 
in constructive discussion (Hallin 2000; McQuail 2005). 
Schudson observes that although ‘journalistic deference 
to democratic political institutions may be weakening,’ 
the press offers an important space to ‘civic’ voices over 
‘official’ or ‘statist’ pronouncements, and journalistic or 
media practice tend to stand ‘in support of the importance 
of public life and the common good’ (2003: 210–211).
The liberal approach of defining normative journalism 
has systematically been challenged by non-liberal scholars 
of Marxist and critical political economy leanings (Bolaño 
1999; McQuail 2005; Mosco 2006). A central aspect of this 
critique is, as Mosco argues, the social and power relations 
that define ‘production, distribution, and consumption 
of communication resources’ (2006: 88). In other words, 
this non-liberal strand emphasizes the need to assess how 
media outlets function and how their products, from 
news content to paid publicity, move from producers to 
the audience, and what effects –in terms of control, nego-
tiation, hegemonic tension– they are likely to have.
A media system that does not cultivate social inclu-
sion, nor balanced representation of the subordinated or 
minority classes, cannot be considered democratic (Keane 
1991; Artz et al 2006). Authors of non-liberal and partici-
patory strands have been critical towards the logic of lib-
eral market-led societies in the sense that these are argued 
not to be committed to the promotion of plural access 
and representation in the media (Sparks 2007; Artz 2017). 
Thus, a different set of normative journalistic ideals –com-
pared to traditional liberal views– which emphasize inclu-
siveness, egalitarianism, popular participation, and plural 
access have been developed. Importantly, this normative 
ideal of popular participation in the media is underpinned 
by the notion, as explained by McQuail, that the domi-
nant elite tend to marginalise ‘opposition and alternative 
voices’, while the ‘public interest in communication is 
subordinated to private interest’ (2005: 100).
In the case of Latin America, it has been argued that 
the liberal narrative in relation to media’s normative ide-
als have accelerated in the region with ‘the expansion of 
information technologies, deregulation and privatiza-
tion of systems of telecommunications and the Internet’ 
(Bolaño 1999: 22). Others contend that this trend has 
clashed in Latin America with some national cases of 
substantial state regulation –in some instances charac-
terized by authoritarian traits (Bisbal 2009). Venezuela 
under Chávez, some argue, is a case of the latter (Ibid, 
Caballero 2010).
Yet, even though the implementation of a set of national 
media policies failed during the late-twentieth century, the 
debate they have generated arguably led to the reformula-
tion of normative aspects of national and regional media 
since (Beltrán 2007). It can be argued that the so-called 
‘Pink tide’ or left-leaning governments in Latin America 
between 2000 and 2015 –nominally Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Ecuador, led by Venezuela under Chávez– favored 
the redevelopment of communication policies in order to 
broaden popular participation and political agency (Ibid; 
Matos 2011; Artz 2017).
Authors such as Laclau (2005) find that populism, par-
ticularly in the context of Latin America, is an adequate 
mechanism –albeit highly complex– by which the state 
can lead an increasingly egalitarian, participative and 
communitarian form of democracy while undermining 
the social and political tradition of domination as led by 
the elites. Under this perspective, populist media politics 
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–statist, centralized, nationalist and anti-oligarchic– are 
argued to be a key tool for social transformation, by which 
liberal or capitalist paradigms can be challenged and even 
repudiated in the name of notions of ‘egalitarianism’, 
‘national sovereignty’, ‘popular emancipation’, among 
others. Yet, as argues Arditi, populism of this bent tends 
to be guided by leaders who act as ‘political brokers that 
bypass formal mechanisms of representation wherever it 
suits them,’ while aiming to intensify political polariza-
tion (2007: 55).
An examination of the existing views of populism high-
lights a tendency in these types of regimes to adverse lib-
eral media models. As argued by various critics, in Latin 
America during the twenty-first century –and particularly 
in Venezuela– it seems that populist regimes have not 
promoted in the media core values and concepts under-
pinned by liberal theories, such as freedom of expression, 
right of information, watchdog function, among others, 
within a national context (Cañizalez 2009; Keane 2009; 
Waisbord 2011). Instead, such governments have clashed 
variably with both traditional liberal and neo-liberal prin-
ciples of the press and challenged their normative tenets 
(Bisbal 2009). The lack of ‘social and political consensus’ 
sought by populist governments as part of their strategies 
imposes various challenges ‘to firm up professionalism’ in 
the media and to prize normative ideals among journal-
ists, as promoted by liberal views (Waisbord 2013: 39).
In this sense, and according to most studies, Chávez 
represented a quintessential example of a personalist and 
populist leader, spearheading a process of nominally par-
ticipatory, anti-liberal and radical democracy; which was 
often evaluated as authoritarian and relatively caudillista 
–as in a long tradition of the military men that ruled many 
Latin American nations during the nineteenth century 
(Zúquete 2008; Frajman 2014; Cañizalez 2016).
The mechanisms in Latin American populism –as has 
been visible in Venezuela under Chávez (and his successor 
Maduro)– by which liberal-leaning outlets are restrained 
or attacked while media reforms and statization are imple-
mented leads, as observe Bisbal (2009) and Waisbord 
(2012), to intensifying confrontation between the ‘pro-
government’ and the ‘oppositional’ forces, and to general 
political polarization.
Scope, empirical approach, and data
Drawing from various explanatory works about research 
methodology, the nature of this study demanded an 
empirical approach based on a qualitative investigation of 
the opinions and attitudes of journalists, media workers 
and media commentators in Venezuela. Qualitative inter-
viewing was an adequate technique for gathering and ana-
lyzing this type of data (Kvale 1996; Wengraf 2002).
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were carried 
out with seventy-one individuals. The significant major-
ity of these were Venezuelan journalists and editors; and 
eighteen news media owners or managers, media scholars 
and commentators, media-related NGOs’ spokespersons, 
politicians and public functionaries. The journalists, edi-
tors and media practitioners interviewed worked in vari-
ous mediums –the majority of these were in broadcasting 
and/or print news outlets. At the time, Venezuelan broad-
cast and print media employed, as a collective, the largest 
amount of professional journalists compared to other 
industries (Castellanos 2009).
To achieve breadth of scope and to obtain a coherent 
qualitative sample, the empirical study relied on inter-
viewees that displayed significant variation in the opin-
ions and general data they were able to provide (Gobo 
2004). The nature of the study required that the sample 
of interviewees was heterogeneous –particularly in their 
political and ideological viewpoints (Ibid; Weiss 1995). 
The media professionals interviewed were chosen primar-
ily on the basis of their own political and political align-
ment and that of the news media outlet they worked for, 
across a variety of media organizations. Due to the highly-
polarized political environment in Venezuela, it was feasi-
ble to define the sample of the interviews in terms of the 
politico-ideological positioning of the news organizations 
these worked for during the 2000s –such was the visibil-
ity of political polarization in Venezuelan media (Bisbal 
2008; Cañizalez 2009).
Most interviews were carried out face-to-face in 
Venezuela, while twenty-two were conducted via Skype or 
over the telephone; each lasting a minimum of forty-five 
minutes. All were carried out during three different spells: 
March 2012-June 2012; December 2013-January 2014; 
May 2015-July 2015. The study had the full cooperation 
of all interviewees. All were adults and consented to par-
ticipate in the interviewing process, without raising any 
ethical concerns or specific considerations. However, six 
of the interviewees –out of a total of 71– requested ano-
nymity due to varying reasons. Hence their names were 
not reproduced in the study’s text and details of their 
posts and workplace are not mentioned.
During the interviewing process the vast majority of 
participants –if not all– reflected an almost binary divide 
in terms of their understanding of democracy, populism, 
Chávez’s leadership, the role of the media, and journalis-
tic values. It also became clear that Chávez had, accord-
ing to every interviewee, attempted to shift the country’s 
political path, and in doing so became a very divisive 
figure. Hence, the results of the interviews are presented 
in this study following a predominantly binary pattern 
–opinions of pro-Chávez media practitioners and com-
mentators on the one hand, and those of the opposition 
on the other.
Importantly, in order to interpret the substantial data 
emerging from the qualitative interviews, while being con-
sistent with the aim of this study, four different themes of 
discussion were developed in order to organize, present, 
and assess the empirical findings in a coherent manner. 
These thematic strands, informed by the theories reviewed 
and by a preliminary empirical exploration mainly relying 
on six ‘pilot’ interviews, relate to how Venezuelan journal-
ists, media practitioners and commentators understand 
and assess the following: 1) Chávez’s style of leadership, 
2) Chávez’s general media strategy, 3) Aló Presidente and 
its impact on Venezuelan media/journalistic practice, 
and 4) official blanket broadcasts and their impact on 
Venezuelan media/journalistic practice.
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Professionals’ assessment of Chávez’s type of 
leadership
This study’s first thematic strand of analysis addresses 
the opinions gathered from journalists and media prac-
titioners about how they understand Hugo Chávez’s style 
of leadership and communication. In order to assess the 
views of these professionals towards the character and 
impact of Aló Presidente and to cadenas, it is essential to 
review the varying –and mostly polarized– manners in 
which Venezuelan media practitioners understand his 
type of governance and political persona. As a starting 
point, all interviewees expressed that Chávez’s leadership 
represented a substantial shift in Venezuelan politics and 
an unprecedented form of government. Yet, there prevails 
a binary interpretation of the type of socio-political pro-
ject he promoted.
Chávez’s sympathizers interviewed described him as a 
‘revolutionary’ or ‘anti-imperialist’ or ‘anti-oligarchic’ dem-
ocrat. Very few of this group defined him as a populist. 
As interviewee Ernesto Villegas, Minister of Information 
and Communication explained: ‘if being a populist means 
representing and being popular among the disenfran-
chised, then Chávez was certainly a populist; if it means 
being manipulative with the people then he certainly 
was not’. Workers of government-owned media outlets 
coincided that Chávez was undeniably popular, and was 
a much needed figure in leading a political process which 
upended an old two-party ‘corrupt’ political system of neo-
liberal policies.
Marco Hernández, Director at state-run Conatel 
(National Telecommunications Commission), found that 
a key aspect of the radical and anti-liberal character of 
Chávez’s political process was the way his government 
broke down an entrenched capitalist tradition with the 
nation, and that “the President found an effective way 
to convey this message through his popular discourse 
and media strategies”. A significant majority of inter-
viewees working in pro-Chávez outlets also found that 
prior to his arrival to the Presidency, the political and 
media model that dominated Venezuela was distinc-
tively elitist.
When Chávez’s political project was defined by some 
interviewees as anti-imperialist, they also articulated a 
need to challenge the ‘dominant’ and political role that 
the U.S. played in Venezuela and Latin America during the 
twentieth century. Importantly, many considered that the 
Chávez administration represented a non-conventional 
type of democracy, one that is not only anti-imperialist 
but also inclusive and participatory.
This radical process of popular empowerment and social 
transformation, according to the views of most of the pro-
government professionals interviewed, needed the leader-
ship of Chávez –and that of his successor Maduro. They 
argued that Chávez spearheaded a movement of social 
inclusion and alleviation of poverty, and that he possessed 
a unique capacity to express ‘the will of the people’. A 
majority of pro-government interviewees approved of 
Chávez’s heterodox, popular, and personalist way to lead 
and communicate with Venezuelans in order to attain 
political and social transformation.
Indeed, very few interviewees belonging to the opposi-
tion or of a dissident character challenged the notion that 
Chávez established a deep connection with the disenfran-
chised sectors of Venezuelan society. Yet, the vast majority 
of this group of media practitioners esteemed that Chávez 
increasingly violated democratic values and independent 
institutionalism in Venezuela. His political persona was 
described as that of a ‘populist’, or ‘demagogue’, or ‘cau-
dillo’. Here, the concept of populism, according to most of 
these interviewees, has pejorative connotations.
Teodoro Petkoff, former Editor of daily TalCual, sus-
tained that Chávez’s leadership gradually turned into an 
autocracy of sorts. After 2007, according to him, it became 
clear that Chávez’s political project relied entirely on 
his personal leadership. Many liberal media practition-
ers agreed with this statement. Moreover, and according 
to Taisa Medina, former Information Editor at daily El 
Universal, the President imposed ‘an autocracy, curbing 
human rights and limiting basic freedoms, including the 
freedom of the press as we knew it during previous admin-
istrations’. Some interviewees concurred with this view, 
yet some said that although Chávez established a highly-
personalist Presidency there were spaces in the media for 
dissent –albeit these were few and selective, and gradually 
decreased.
Importantly, a large group of journalists and editors 
interviewed disagreed with the definition of Chávez’s 
government as authentically modelled in participatory 
democracy. Moreover, many considered that although the 
Chávez’s administration introduced political changes in 
Venezuela, these did not hold a revolutionary nature; but 
were more aligned with the populist caudillo tradition of 
some nineteenth-century military men in Latin America.
Interviewee Marcelino Bisbal, media scholar at 
Universidad Andrés Bello, defined Chávez’s political pro-
ject as hybrid in nature; as one that ‘mixed strong populist 
and militarist elements, riding on a wave of pseudo-leftist 
rhetoric’. Ewald Scharfenberg, founder of Armando. Info 
website, like other media professionals working in private 
outlets, argued that in Venezuela as of 2002, there existed 
a pseudo-institutional structure but there was no real sep-
aration of powers. ‘The estate, the legislative power, the 
judiciary power and so on were all dominated by Chávez,’ 
he said. This, he sustained, became more entrenched 
as time went by. The majority of pro-opposition voices 
agreed with Scharfenberg’s perception; and in sum high-
lighted that Chávez’s government weakened institutional 
and multi-party democracy.
Professionals’ assessment of Chávez’s media 
strategy
This thematic strand of the study sought to describe and 
discuss the opinions of journalists, media practitioners 
and commentators of different politico-ideological stand-
ings in relation to how they understand and ‘negotiate’ 
with Chávez’s communication strategies and mediated 
messages. Indeed, all interviewees expressed that Chávez 
was a very mediatic President and was clearly aware of the 
strategic power of the media. Arguably, all could concur 
with Bisbal’s idea that Chávez’s form of governing was 
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‘hyper-Presidentialist’ in the sense that his persona was 
central in defining the political debate and that his medi-
ated presence was almost ubiquitous.
Every interviewee working in pro-Chávez media 
expressed that no Venezuelan head of government had 
utilized the media for politico-ideological purposes so 
intensely and skilfully as Chávez. This, most of them 
argued, was evident in his constant presence through 
Aló Presidente and the blanket official messages; but 
also in the way his government promoted communitar-
ian media, re-launched some print and broadcast outlets 
such as newspaper Correo del Orinoco and 24-hour news 
international TV network in Telesur, and reformed media 
policies. Importantly, some of these interviewees argued 
that, after Aló Presidente, the elaboration of a framework 
for pro-Chávez communitarian media was a salient media 
project of his. According to Conatel, in 2013 there existed 
around 400 communitarian media outlets –mostly radio 
stations– compared to less than 50 before the arrival of 
Chávez to power. This figure has declined dramatically 
during the Maduro administration.
The use of state-owned media, the promotion of com-
munitarian media, the concentration of media networks 
ownership –with Aló Presidente as its spearhead– were 
crucial characteristics of Chávez’s media strategy. These, 
some interviewees argued, belong to a form of democ-
racy modelled in ideals of ‘egalitarianism’ and of ‘rule by 
the people’. Also, a majority of interviewees working in 
Chavista media were of the opinion that Chávez’s use of 
the media was a necessary counter-hegemonic mechanism 
aimed at reducing the influence of U.S. information flow. 
Moreover, this group argued that Aló Presidente played a 
crucial counter-hegemonic role.
Clodovaldo Hernández, who worked at Aporrea.org, 
indicated that Chávez government’s handling of the 
media meant a significant shift not only in Venezuela but 
arguably in the region. Chávez’s ‘communication model’, 
he said, ‘meant going against the grain of a neo-liberal-
ism, oligarchic model that existed in many parts of Latin 
America’. A vast majority of workers in Chavista media 
agreed that in order to challenge ‘neo-liberal standards’ 
and ‘elitist rule’, Chávez’s mediated presence and his 
critique of the opposition media were requirements for 
socio-political change.
Many in the Chavista media workers argued that 
Chávez’s challenge of the status quo led to a strong polari-
zation in society which was mirrored in the media. Such 
high level of polarization had not existed since the rule of 
dictator Juan Vicente Gómez, during the early-twentieth 
century. The discourse imposed by Chávez confronting 
an ‘oligarchic’ system was central in deepening political 
polarization in the country and establishing a binary read-
ing of reality. This, almost every interviewee agreed, was 
most visible in the media, and was spurred specially by the 
President’s Sunday program.
The pro-government media sought to actively amplify 
what Chávez said during Aló Presidente. Most of the jour-
nalists working in pro-government media described their 
reliance on covering the President’s broadcast program as 
both ‘positive’ and ‘necessary’ for elaborating a significant 
part of their news content, particularly until 2012 –year in 
which Chávez’s health became very frail.
On the other side of the political spectrum, many oppo-
sitional voices expressed that Chávez governed ‘from the 
media’ in a ‘non-democratic’ manner, particularly by using 
Aló Presidente and cadenas. Some added that although he 
could be considered a ‘natural’ communicator, he could 
also be characterized as a ‘media showman’. Various critics 
of the President argued that he imposed statism on the 
media and regulation in an authoritarian way, while also 
using as many media spaces as possible to promote his 
ideals and policies. Many also sustained that his commu-
nication strategy relied strongly on state propaganda, and 
was influenced by Fidel Castro’s model in Cuba.
Moreover, a majority of interviewees that work in pro-
opposition media argued that a key component of Chávez’s 
media strategy was to restrict public debate, and that the 
role of the media was negatively affected in part because 
of Chávez’s ‘non-democratic’ stance. Although there was 
some level of freedom of expression in the media until 
Chávez’s death, the quality of discussion and informa-
tion ‘diminished dramatically’, particularly because of the 
‘intimidation and bullying’ critics of Chávez suffered from 
the government and its followers, according to Hernán 
Lugo-Galicia, reporter at El Nacional daily. Almost eve-
ryone on the opposition camp agreed with this opinion. 
Many of them highlighted that soon after Chávez’s death, 
and during Maduro’s government, intimidation and har-
assment towards journalists became more entrenched.
When assessing the country’s high level of political 
polarization and the media, the majority of oppositional 
journalists interviewed coincided that Chávez’s mediated 
discourse was a crucial component in the configuration of 
a much divided political landscape. Significantly, Chávez 
also brought forth the novelty of hyper-politicization 
among the poorer sectors, according to the majority of 
interviewees. And what seemed apparent, argued Hugo 
Prieto, former reporter at El Nacional, is that hyper-polit-
icization was deliberately promoted by Chávez and then 
by Maduro in order to impose a specific political model. 
It could be argued that such hyper-politicization con-
tributed to the configuration of a highly polarized social 
scenario while also providing part of the poorer and disen-
franchised sectors a sense of political empowerment.
Professionals’ assessment of Aló Presidente 
and its impact on media practice
The third thematic strand seeks to discuss the opinions 
of journalists, media practitioners and commentators spe-
cifically in relation to the characteristics of Aló Presidente 
and how the broadcast program shaped in different ways 
journalistic practice vis-à-vis liberal normative or non-lib-
eral media ideals.
Even though the valuation of Chávez’s media persona 
and strategy seem predominantly constructed within 
a binary scheme, the bulk of interviewees concur that 
Venezuela’s President was an effective strategist par-
ticularly in using Aló Presidente to mobilize his political 
supporters, convey political messages to the public, influ-
ence the news and opinion agenda, and portray himself 
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as a popular leader. Most of his supporters interviewed 
claimed that Chávez’s mediated personality and charisma 
was best displayed in Aló Presidente.
Carlos Revette, reporter at National Assembly TV station, 
argued that Aló Presidente introduced a new media format 
by which the leader of a popular process maintained a ‘per-
manent dialogue with the people’, particularly with ‘those 
that had been neglected by the previous governing elites’. 
When asked for a qualitative evaluation of Aló Presidente 
and its pertinence as an instrument for democratic com-
munication, all interviewees working in pro-government 
media concurred that it was an asset for democratic and 
popular participation, and for combating oppositional 
political forces. Importantly, many of these pro-govern-
ment journalists considered that Chávez should have fur-
ther used his broadcast program to expose wrongdoings 
by public officials, opposition leaders, and the pro-opposi-
tion media –in short, they argue that the President should 
have acted more robustly in a watchdog role.
A significant majority of interviewees agreed that 
through Aló Presidente Chávez was able to establish an 
important portion of the news agenda for the national 
media, and to some degree for foreign outlets ones. In 
this sense, Felipe Saldivia, Editor of Ciudad Caracas pro-
Chávez newspaper, argued that with the broadcast pro-
gram Chávez not only managed to establish the topics 
for news media agendas, but also most of the themes to 
be debated in society. Many Chavista interviewees argued 
that the traditional news media found an atypical commu-
nication product in Aló Presidente and that it was neces-
sary to confront with it opposition and liberal views.
Among pro-opposition interviewees the dominant 
trend of opinions regarding Chávez’s Aló Presidente, its 
type of messages and rhetoric, was that it was negative 
for the country’s democracy. The words of Petkoff argu-
ably condensed what many of this group of interviewees 
expressed: ‘Aló Presidente represents Chávez’s wish to 
be omnipresent in every home and impose his person-
alist regime, through an incendiary rhetoric much like 
that of caudillos of the past’. Many of these interviewees 
also said that, with Aló Presidente, Chávez bypassed the 
Constitution by accusing and harassing persons that were 
critical towards his government, often charging oppo-
nents of wrongdoing or even criminal activity without 
allowing any legal trial for the accused person. Some inter-
viewees who are critical of Chavismo were convinced that 
these accusations made by Chávez led the way for mobi-
lizing government loyalists against the persons whom the 
President accused –sometimes resulting in violent attacks 
on journalists and dissents.
Most non-Chavista interviewees esteemed that Aló 
Presidente established the news agenda to a significant 
degree for all media; yet, on the other hand, the pro-
gram for this groups represented ‘a kind of apartheid 
on behalf of the President and the government’ towards 
the dissident media –to use political reporter Cristina 
Marcano’s expression. It is noteworthy that, according 
to some independent journalists interviewed, many pri-
vate news outlets fell into a ‘comfort zone’ when covering 
and reviewing Aló Presidente, as at times the program’s 
content, in essence, lacked newsworthiness. It also shifted 
dramatically the news gathering and production rou-
tines of many journalists, particularly within the private 
media –as expressed by some interviewees. ‘We had no 
time to investigate other political stories, as most stories 
gravitated –specially during the two or three days after the 
broadcast– around what was said in Aló Presidente,’ added 
Medina.
The strong communication linkage between the 
President and his followers by means of Aló Presidente 
was acknowledged by most private-media journalists, but 
these emphasized that in their opinion the main aim of 
the broadcast program was for Chávez to impose his views 
on the general national news agenda, mobilize his follow-
ers, and for him to become as ubiquitous as possible, even 
if at times the viewing share for his program was below 
fifteen per cent of the audience, as argued Bisbal.
Professionals’ assessment of cadenas and their 
impact on media practice
The fourth thematic strand assesses interviewees’ opinions 
about how Chávez’s use of official blanket broadcasts and 
how these affected regular programing and journalistic 
practice. It is worth highlighting that by early 2010 Chávez 
had presented 2,000 editions of official blanket broad-
casts. According to Reporters Without Borders (2009) 
between 1999 and 2008 Chávez addressed Venezuelans 
through the media during 2,370 hours via Aló Presidente 
and in official blanket broadcasts combined. This phe-
nomenon shaped news production and agenda-setting in 
Venezuelan media, according to most interviewees.
Pro-Chávez journalists expressed their support for the 
official blanket broadcasts. They argued that the latter 
represented an effective way to inform Venezuelans about 
governmental decisions, actions and policies. ‘Because the 
private media still had a large portion of the audience, 
cadenas were a necessary means to present reality in the 
view of Chávez and his supporters –who represented the 
majority of the country,’ explained an interviewee. As to 
how cadenas affect normative journalism, the majority of 
pro-Chavez media professional expressed that the former 
disseminate information that is in the interest of the peo-
ple, for the ‘greater good’; and hence should be under-
stood as a communicational complement to professional 
informative journalism.
In official and pro-government media –which, in terms 
of number of outlets, represented the majority by the end 
of Chávez’s rule– cadenas defined the news agenda to an 
important degree, according to most interviewees. Once 
these official messages were broadcast, relevant aspects of 
them were covered as news in all of the official and pro-
government outlets.
However, in the opinion of all interviewees working in 
pro-opposition media, the government transmitted this 
type of messages abusively. This group of interviewees 
emitted very critical opinions about what they argued 
became a systematic interruption of regular program-
ming and curbing of freedom in the media. Scharfenberg 
expressed that cadenas interrupted regular broadcast pro-
gramming ‘almost on a daily basis’, and that this ‘violates 
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elemental norms of freedom of expression’ as well as 
‘norms of balance and impartiality’ in the media. The 
majority of interviewees working in the private media 
concurred with Scharfenberg’s comments.
‘The authoritarian quality and quantity of cadenas have 
no parallel in the history of Latin America,’ argued Isnardo 
Bravo, reporter at pro-opposiiton network RCTV. The con-
tent of the cadenas –in the opinion of many interviewees– 
responded more to a propaganda strategy than to one of 
ethical information. Importantly, this group esteemed that 
the Presidential/official blanket broadcasts also aimed to 
weaken the sense of independence and the watchdog role 
of the private media.
It is evident, as gathered from the opinion of most 
private-media workers interviewed that broadcast media 
have been significantly more affected by cadenas than the 
press. The telecommunications laws are explicit about the 
obligation of all national broadcast outlets to carry out 
the live transmission of every official broadcasts. And, as 
explained Bisbal, for the Chávez (and for the Maduro) gov-
ernment it seemed ‘more feasible to become omnipres-
ent through television and radio than through the press’. 
Yet, according to the information gathered, for all their 
systematic and mandatory transmissions cadenas, like 
Aló Presidente, had a relatively reduced audience –never 
exceeding ten percent of the audience share (Castellanos 
2009). This, most non-Chavista interviewees argued, led 
to a ‘migration’ of part of the audience to cable/satellite 
television.
It is of note that mandatory blanket broadcasts increased 
during election periods, as expressed by most interview-
ees. In the opinion of most pro-oppostion interviewees, 
escalation of cadenas during election periods were the 
result of Chávez’s efforts to boost his own candidacy or 
that of his party members –a practice they found to be 
‘unethical’, ‘coercing’, ‘anti-democratic’, and which ulti-
mately reduced civic debate.
As a way of resuming these critical perceptions of cade-
nas, an interviewee formulated that they constituted 
‘a tribune for the President to insult and intimidate dis-
sidents’, and also ‘a loss of money for the private media, 
the impossibility of a plural and balanced transmission 
of news, the curbing of dissenting contents and loss of 
press autonomy, and the imposition of government prop-
aganda’. This phenomenon, they argued, contributed to 
polarization and a gradual collapse of democratic media. 
However, Chavista professionals, in sum, countered these 
arguments in their understanding of cadenas as an inte-
gral part of a radical communication project – ‘emancipa-
tory’, ‘participatory, ‘popular’, which challenged the public 
interest in the context of a ‘revolutionary process.’
Conclusions
Opinions and perceptions of Venezuelan media practi-
tioners and commentators indicate that Chavez’s style of 
leadership and use of the media reflect aspects of the logic 
of populism as partly defined by Laclau (2005), Arditi 
(2007), and Keane (2009). Under Chávez’s government, 
Venezuela represented the ‘grey area’ that is populism in 
democracy dynamics. Within the nation’s media a binary 
discourse became prevalent –political standings were 
defined to an important degree by the symbolic construc-
tion of an enemy and through the rhetoric of systematic 
confrontation.
Albeit many pro-Chávez’s interviewees esteemed that 
defining him as ‘populist’ alone means focus is lost on 
his revolutionary, participatory and emancipatory ideas; 
many interviewees of liberal leanings coincided with the 
views of authors such as Bisbal (2008), Zúquete (2008), 
and Arditi (2009) in that Chávez can be identified as a 
populist leader –within the Latin American tradition– of 
anti-liberal and authoritarian traits.
As gathered from existing literature and highlighted 
by this study’s interviewees, Chávez’s ‘hyper-leadership’ 
relied significantly on the use of media –mainly broad-
cast– and it is evident that he was able to establish a 
relentless media presence for himself in Venezuela. With 
such media ubiquity he strategically propagated his polit-
ical messages, built a platform for popular participation 
for his followers, set the national news agenda while con-
demning oppositional and critical figures. The new politi-
cal and media landscape in Venezuela that Chávez and the 
opposition co-created divisive opinions and revealed to be 
problematic, as expressed for this study by journalists and 
media practitioners. Chávez’s media strategy sought to 
challenge the political establishment, the media elite, and 
their liberal leanings; and was effective in doing so nation-
ally, while establishing a template of sorts for other Latin 
American populist leaders.
This empirical study found that hardly any neutral 
opinions were found in relation to Chávez’s use of his 
talk-show Aló Presidente and recurring blanket messages. 
His followers and sympathizers that work in the media 
esteemed that the President’s intense broadcast presence 
was and continues to be positive for the deepening of a 
revolutionary process and for public life. In this sense, it 
can be argued that Chávez’s media strategy was guided 
by a political ideal that sought to enhance a non-liberal 
form of governance while also channeling the popular dis-
enchantment towards pre-existing liberal or ‘elitist’ poli-
cies, as have argued Ellner (2007), Lander (2008) and Artz 
(2017). Aló Presidente and some of the blanket broadcasts 
simulate a direct connection between the people and the 
President, and some consider they boosted an indispen-
sable relationship between ‘leader’ and ‘revolutionaries’. 
Importantly, and according to the views of most interview-
ees, within the political tug-of-war between Chavismo and 
opposition forces, Aló Presidente and cadenas proved to 
be strategically successful in mitigating efforts by the 
private media to check on or criticize Chávez’s govern-
ance. This, in the view of some interviewees, is part of a 
radical emancipatory challenge to the pre-exiting (neo)
liberal Venezuelan socio-political landscape. This group 
of journalists –all Chávez sympathizers– proved to have a 
non-liberal assessment of what ‘normative’ media practice 
is: it should be guided mainly by revolutionary ideals of 
egalitarianism and popular participation, and contrary to 
private interests. In this sense, their views are varyingly 
aligned with Marxist and political economy paradigms, 
as critically formulated by Bolaño (1999), Mosco (2006), 
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Artz (2017), among other authors of counter-hegemonic 
stances.
The pervasive manner in which Chávez employed Aló 
Presidente and blanket official messages clashes with lib-
eral values and, according to pro-opposition interviewees, 
undermines freedom of expression and democratic prac-
tice. Their view is that Chávez’s mediatic discourse did not 
stimulate constructive debate within Venezuela’s society, 
which ought to be a key role of the media in democracy, 
according to liberal views and as explained by Keane 
(1991), Schudson (2003), and Bisbal (2009).
While in power, Chávez’s mediatic ubiquity was per-
ceived as a crucial supportive force for journalists desiring 
radical social change. For another group of media profes-
sionals, it became a dilemma. The news agenda, in the 
opinion of pro-opposition interviewees, became markedly 
determined by Chávez’s statements in his broadcast pro-
grams. This represented a new phenomenon in the nation 
–in modern times, no Venezuelan President’s media pres-
ence had been so prevalent and agenda-defining. As a 
partial result, this study found, critical journalists became 
agents of polarization and were mostly unable to deliver 
balanced portrayals of reality –as held by liberal tenets of 
journalistic practice (Schudson 1995).
Various populist leaders have emerged since Chávez 
globally, and in most cases they have also brought forth 
polarization within their respective national context. 
Similarly, many of them employ the media in a personal-
ist and anti-establishment manner while also challenging 
liberal normative elements of journalism. Arguably, some 
of these environments are less opaque than Chávez’s or 
indeed of Maduro’s Venezuela, hence populism and the 
media might be assessed more openly in these other con-
texts. In the case of Venezuela, this has become increas-
ingly difficult as Maduro has closed down most avenues 
of democratic practice in what some analysts define as 
a dictatorship (Provea 2014; Reporters Without Borders 
2016; Espacio Público 2018). This, Maduro has carried out 
while strategically resorting to images and sound-bites of 
his mentor Hugo Chávez.
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